Dabney and the Will's Movement

One of the things that concerns me about the modern use of terms like "libertarian" or "compatibilist" is that it is hard to read a lot of earlier Reformed thinkers, since they didn't really fit into either camp.  While I would come down closer to the compatibilist camp, I wonder how often the fine distinctions can be maintained.  In any case, here is R L Dabney on human volition.  The relevance is that Dabney affirmed a strong doctrine of the will's free choice, albeit limited.  This allows us to blunt libertarian critiques of Reformed theology.

On the converse:  if you think that Jonathan Edwards's view is the Reformed view of the will, you will find it much, much harder to argue cogently for a moral universe.

Calvinists mean by “will” the whole subjective activities.  This includes disposition and subjective desires, both of which lead to volition (III: 221).  The important point for Dabney is that volition--the act of willing--must be cause or influenced by something.  The Calvinist finds the proximate cause in our disposition and subjective desires.

In regeneration God efficiently produces the holy disposition which regulates (acts as proximate cause) man’s volitions (227).  This means that in a very real sense, man is causing his actions from within himself.

Dabney accepts Edwards’s larger premise but notes Edwards erred in linking the motive of volition as the object and efficient of a volition (237).

Holy Fire, Not Strange, chapters 1-4

Chapter 1 is simply a string of recycled sermon notes on how silly and evil various brands of charismania are.  Okay, but anyone can play this game.  I agree there are hucksters and there is a special place in hell for them, but this is not an argument.  Macarthur does actually get to something like an argument:

Thesis:  "It is the elevation of experience over the authority of Scripture that grieves and demeans the Holy Spirit most of all" (Macarthur 17).

I have several observations:   1) it is dangerous to elevate experience over theology, but where is the proof that it grieves the Holy Spirit most of all?  How does Macarthur know this?  The Scriptures he cites are about the Holy Spirit's inspiring the Word and the Spirit's testifying to Christ.  Great, but that is immaterial to this thesis.  Indeed, is this not Macarthur's own experience?

2) If this is Macarthur's thesis, and if he is successful in proving it (I don't think he can be), then we should note that the truth of continuationism stands or falls independent of this thesis.

Chapter 2

This is a history of the modern Pentecostal movement and most of it, while interesting, is irrelevant to his thesis.  Except for one part:

But here is the point to all of this history:  if the Holy Spirit intended to recreate the day of Pentecost, is this really how he would do it? (27)

I really don't know what to say.  I suppose some early Pentecostals said something like this.  Sam Storms specifically argued against this point.  See Point 9.  Macarthur continues,

Why focus on these two men [Charles Parham and E. W. Kenyon]?  The answer is simple.  These two men are responsible for the theological foundations upon which the entire charismatic system is built (31)

At this point I have no idea if this historiography is true. I am not persuaded that one can make a 1:1 connection between the early Pentecostals and Wayne Grudem.   Genealogical arguments are always dangerous to make and they rarely deliver on their promises.

Chapter 3

In chapters 3 and 4 JM relies on Edwards’ analysis of revival, and I think it is a good–if incomplete–analysis of any “spiritual” movement.

1. Does the work exalt the true Christ?
2. Does it oppose worldliness?
3. Does it point people to the Scriptures?
4. Does it elevate the truth?
5. Does it produce love for God and others?

I've dealt with the specifics here.   It really is a good chapter.  He notes (rightly) that the Spirit testifies of Christ, so those who are filled with the Spirit will testify of Christ.  Sadly, this is absent from a large part of the Charismatic world.

I do find it interesting, though, that Macarthur didn't clinch his argument with Revelation 19:10, "The testimony of Jesus is the Spirit of Prophecy."  In fact, the book doesn't mention this verse at all.

Chapter 4, same contd.

Most of this chapter reads like the tabloids.  Interesting, mind you, but not really germane to the thesis, except where noted above.

Cessationism's missing premise

This post is not arguing that cessationism is wrong.  I am simply looking at one of it's arguments. Cessationists use "revelation" in an equivocal sense.  This is a problem when we examine practices in the 1st century church.  Paul tells the church to prophesy (and one can find numerous other examples).  How does the cessationist respond?

First, let's look at the argument:

1: God's speaking is what constitutes revelation, and revelation was eventually codified in the canon.

 This seems to entail the following:

2: The canon is closed (let's leave aside messy issues like who had the authority to close the canon and how do you know).

I think Ephesians 2:20 affords the cessationist another premise:

3.  The church is built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets.  Assuming apostles means those associated in one way or another with Jesus's ministry, I think we can safely affirm (and this would be the position of many continuationists) that apostles aren't around today.  Therefore,

3.1.  Prophets aren't around, either.

The Continuationist Responds,

Is (P1) true?  I agree with the first half if it is phrased like this:  God reveals himself and this usually happens by speech or in words (whether internal or external).  The second half of P1 is unproven.

What about P2?  Practically, we have to assume that the canon is closed, but we have no evidence from God that it is.  Honestly, how do you know the canon is closed?  I think wiser Protestants were right to say that the Canon is "a fallible collection of infallible books" and leave it at that.

As to P3, my question is:  are all acts of "prophesying" in the New Testament establishing the foundation of the church?  Are Phillip's daughters part of that foundation?  When Paul acknowledges different men are prophesying is that, too, part of the foundation?  Maybe, but we have no evidence that such is what Paul meant.

The only way the cessationist can salvage this position is to add another premise:

P4:  Paul's command to prophesy only functioned until the canon was closed.

The main problem with that statement is there isn't a single verse that says that.

Modern Theonomy: A Crisis of Vision, A Crisis of Voice

It's hard to get excited about the recent theonomy debate.  It doesn't matter who "won."  (Is it really possible to objectively "win" a debate, anyway?)  Even if theonomy "won" that debate, it would be a Pyrrhic victory, which leads to the point of this post:

Quo vadis, Theonomy?

Who is the public leader and spokesman for theonomy today?  One could remark that since it is not a "movement," there is no need for a leader.  That's not true, though.  Even if the US Govt introduces theonomic codes, which will never happen, some "voice" will be informing said Republican Congressmen.   And such a voice in any situation usually will be the most capable.

So who is the voice?

Probably American Vision, I think.  They are the ones sponsoring the debates and putting out the material.  One could say "Chalcedon Foundation," but American Vision has traditionally been pro-GOP politics, so they get the edge.

Leaders like Gentry will not take the role for a variety of reasons.  Morecraft is the bishop, practically speaking, of his own denomination and he has mostly alienated all of NAPARC.  Leaders can't be merely capable.  They have to have influence as well.

Who else is out there that doesn't reduce to one of the above categories?

So why is this a problem if it falls to American Vision?  It's a problem for theonomy because theonomic discussions are now divorced from the Church setting, particularly at the synodal level.  Whatever problems NAPARC leaders may have, presbyteries can hold each other accountable and keep a lot of nonsense from emerging.  Would the debate over the audio rights happened if there were mature third-party mediation (like a synod)?  You see my point.

And since most NAPARC churches merely tolerate theonomy, theonomists now that they can't "make a difference" from within the churches themselves.  They literally have to go "outside" the church.   At this point any "kingdom activity" has been reduced to the level of a parachurch (and Rushdoony was quite explicit on this point).  Now people will have to face the question:  where do I want to invest time and money where it will do the most (perceived) good?

The Church doesn't promise civic righteousness.  It doesn't promise outward justice lex talionis.   It is the kingdom of mercy (though aspects of judgment are present).  The Church promises that Jesus will feed you at his Table.  The Church promises that Jesus will speak to you from his Word.

If given the choice at the end of the day, what would you prefer:  Taking Back City Hall or Eating with Jesus?

Reformed Epistemology Beyond Plantinga

Owen Anderson has written a small piece aiming to show difficulties in Alvin Plantinga’s conception of warrant.   Anderson asserts that Plantinga’s position leaves the unbeliever with a legitimate excuse for not believing in the Christian God.  Along the way Anderson advances a number of philosophical theses that I maintain are problematic for a Reformed Christian and subsequently limit the agreement one has concerning his critique of Plantinga.

This paper will follow the following structure:

1. Plantinga and Warrant
2. Anderson’s Critique
3. Anderson Critiqued
4. Warrant without Defeaters
5. Anderson’s position incompatible with Reformed Theology
6. Plantinga Reconsidered
7. Conclusion

Plantinga and Warrant

In short, Plantinga’s position maintains that one is warranted in believing in God without having to give justification for foundationalist evidential demands.  Further, one is warranted in knowledge if one’s cognitive faculties are functioning properly in a proper environment.

Anderson’s Critique

Anderson says Plantinga’s position is incompatible with Christian teaching because of the following claims:

1. Guilt presupposes inexcusability
2. Inexcusability presupposes ability
3. Ability presupposes clarity
4. Clarity presupposes rationality

The main criticism is that Plantinga (seems) to allow that other religions can claim warrant for belief and thus evade Romans 1:21.  Another criticism is that Plantinga does not allow that God’s existence is sufficiently clear.

Anderson Critiqued

P1 seems like standard ethical and Christian teaching.   P2 is incompatible with Reformed Theology (see below).  P3 is not necessarily wrong, but it rests upon a major confusion throughout Anderson’s paper.  When he says “ability presupposes clarity,” does he mean moral ability or natural ability?  In fact, I don’t think he can answer the question because of his commitment to P2.  However, I don’t disagree that there is a clear, rational standard to which men are held accountable. P4 is fine; however, I have a problem with the way this clause is phrased:  if the alternatives to knowing God are rational then humans have an excuse to not knowing God.

Further, there is a difference between the clarity of God’s revelation and willing not to worship God.  Indeed, Anderson writes, “Inexcusability requires that if they had wanted to, they could have known God as they should have.”  Besides the confusion of moral and natural ability, this entails Anderson’s rather unique view about Romans 1:21. In another essay Anderson argues that this verse does not teach that the heathen knew God, but that God’s special revelation has undergone decay.   

For the moment I feel justified (warranted?) in standing with the tradition of commentaries on Romans 1:21 and say that the unbeliever knew (in some sense; I wonder if we are all interpreting “know” in a univocal sense) God.  

Excursus:  Commentaries on Romans 1:21

(Instead of quoting publisher, text, and page number, I will simply say Charles Hodge in loc, etc.)

John Murray:  “The knowledge of God must in this context be the knowledge derived from the manifestation given in the visible creation...The inexcusableness resides in the fact that being in posession of this knowledge they did not render to God the glory.”

John Calvin: “He plainly testifies here, that God has presented to the minds of all the means of knowing him, having so manifested himself by his works, that they must necessarily see what of themselves they seek not to know.”

Charles Hodge:  “Thus, in the first instance, in verse 19 and 20, he proved that the heathen had a knowledge of God which rendered them inexcusable, and then the fact that they were without excuse, is proved by showing that they did not act in accordance with the truth.”

Anderson says his paper is about “the clarity of God’s existence, not epistemic rights.”  Well, if that’s true then why is Anderson discussing Plantinga’s earlier works (Warrant and Proper Function and Warrant the Current Debate)?  Those books are defending the claim of warrant against foundationalism; they are not attempting to set forth God’s existence.  

A critique on more factual grounds

This doesn’t really affect the substance of the paper, but it’s worth pointing out.  Anderson says “Plantinga never endeavors to show that it is clear that God exists.”  This is odd, since Plantinga has defended the Ontological Argument (Doubleday 1965) and has offered Two Dozen or So arguments for the existence of God.   If this is indeed what Anderson is saying, then (P)3--4 fall.  

Warrant Without Defeaters

Much of Anderson’s critique seems to operate on only half of the Plantingian position.  Anderson writes, “All the adherents of world religions are rational in this broad sense of the term,” yet Christianity holds them accountable without excuse.  This is similar to the famous “Great Pumpkin” charge thrown at Plantinga:  Why can’t someone say that belief in the Great Pumpkin is perfectly basic and one has rational warrant?

If that is all that warrant said, then that would be a problem.  Yet just because one claims “properly basic belief” and “warrant” does not mean the position is immune to defeaters.  Consider:

1. a more thorough and robust account of a warranted belief is one that is not subject to defeaters.  So, I'd say that and adherent of ____(insert deity)_____ has undefeated defeaters (think Islam, for example).
2. Also, if one includes positive arguments (perhaps revamped natural theology ones), then we actually have reasons *for* our belief as well.  Why should I believe in ____(insert deity)_____?  I can tell others why they should believe in ____Yahweh____, can they do the same?
3. many versions of beliefs in _____(insert deity)____ do not provide a basis for our belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties, hence they'd have a defeater for all their beliefs, including belief in ____(insert deity)____.  So, why should the believer in ___Shivah___ think his/her cognitive faculties are reliably aimed at truth?  Does ___Shivah___ believe in those categories (i.e., true/false)?  If not, would he design his "children" to have cognitive faculties with beliefs aimed at truth?  And, if so, why believe this?  Is it revealed in the Vedas?  Where?

Anderson’s Position incompatible with Reformed Theology

Anderson holds to the principle “ought = ability.”  This follows upon his confusion of natural ability with moral ability.  This is not an extreme position to hold, as most free-will theists hold it today.   The problem is that Reformed theology rejects this position.  If [moral] ought = [physical] ability, then man has free will to believe in God apart from considerations of sin.  This is perfectly consistent with Kantian ethics and Arminianism.  It is not with Reformed theology.

Anderson writes, “If this [sin] is the result of something outside my control, then I cannot be held accountable.”  But the consequent does not follow, at least not universally.  What about original sin?  Why am I held accountable for what Adam did?  

Plantinga Reconsidered

Let’s pretend for a moment that Anderson’s critique holds.  What must we give up of Plantinga’s position and what can we retain.  Anderson says Plantinga’s views are incompatible with Christianity, yet one suspects that Anderson is overreaching on Plantinga.  Plantinga’s initial forays into warrant  merely dealt with belief in general in response to Cliffordian Evidentialism.

Beyond Foundations

The initial attraction to Plantinga’s “warrant” is not its providing an argument for the existence of God.  In fact, I don’t think that is Plantinga’s position at all.  As I’ve read the development of Plantinga’s corpus, Plantinga developed his “warrant” in response to classical foundationalism’s challenge on epistemic justification, not for whether warrant offers a “silver bullet” argument for God’s existence (to borrow an illustration from John Frame).  

The evidentialist challenge: if it is not rational to accept some proposition about God, then one ought not to accept it; b) it is not rational to accept such propositions without adequate evidence and with firmness not exceeding the evidence (Wolterstorff 136).  But as Plantinga pointed out, evidentialism of this sort usually connotes a form of internalism: I must satisfy some epistemic duty in order to have proper belief in God.  However, why should we suppose that it is irrational to accept theistic belief in the absence of evidence?  What exactly is the obligation here?  Which intellectual obligations?  What about Russellian paradoxes, when a self-evidently false follows from a self-evidently true?

If internalism is false, as I maintain the above evidential variety is, does this mean some form of externalism follows?  I think so, though I can’t argue it here.  But more to the point:  are all forms of externalism versions of warrant?  I don’t think so.  Reliabilism and models of perception are externalist, though inadequate by themselves.  

Let’s Assume Plantinga is in Fact False

If Plantinga’s account is incorrect, must I abandon externalism and embrace internalism?  I have seen no convincing arguments that I should (though to be fair that wasn’t Anderson’s point). But are all of Plantinga’s unique points wrong?  Let’s consider “proper function.”  If I am drunk are my reasoning faculties performing correctly?  Obviously not.  But that’s probably not why people object to “Proper Function.”  Does sin make my cognitive faculties malfunction?  Well, maybe.  This brings us in to the psychology of belief, a study I am not prepared to enter.

Conclusion

Anderson’s critique has forced Reformed Epistemology adherents to clarify a number of issues.  Unfortunately, one has to pay a high price to fully accept Anderson’s position.  His equivocation of natural/moral ability and is ought = can positions render many of his conclusions unacceptable to traditional Reformed theology.

Works Cited:

Calvin, John. Romans.

Hodge, Charles. Commentary to the Romans.

Murray, John. Commentary to the Romans.

Plantinga, Alvin.  “Reason and Belief in God.” Faith and Rationality.

-----------------.  The Ontological Argument.  Doubleday, 1965.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas.  “Can Belief in God be Rational if it Has no Foundations?”  Faith and Rationality.  Notre Dame.  

Old Thoughts on Strange Fire

I haven't read the entirety of Strange Fire yet.  I plan on it.  But since most of the uproar dealt not with the book but with the Conference (and with Driscoll's crashing the conference.  LOL!), I will go off conference notes.

Let it be said that I am not a card-carrying charismatic.   I simply do not identify with that group.  Truth be told, I am probably closer in sympathy with the Conference men than I am with charismatics of any stripe.

Most cessationists do not realize it, but there are multiple levels of this position.  The most common position is “I believe that was apostolic stuff and ended there, but hey, who knows what God can do today?”  They usually mean–and only mean–miraculous happenings.   With respect to miracles, it’s a fair line.  However, they cannot logically extend that position to prophecy.  The other shade of cessationism says that such happenings are impossible.

Given that there are various shades of cessationism there are also various shades of continuationism.    For sake of ease, I am leaving out the Word-of-Faith movement.  They are false prophets and rarely offer any biblical rationale for their doings. I am dealing with the serious continuationists:  Wayne Grudem, Sam Storms, John Piper, and to a much lesser degree, Mark Driscoll.

I see a problem in identification on the cessationist side.   Originally, Macarthur attacked the Word-of-Faith types (Charismatic Chaos) and we welcomed it.  This conference seems (I say seem because I feel like the goal post shifted) aimed at the recent “Young, Restless, and Reformed” Crowd.  So I need to ask the cessationists of Strange Fire, “Against whom are you arguing?”   You cannot say, “We are responding to a recent phenomena in Evangelical Calvinism” and then preach against witch-doctors.

(Tim Challies has done a fair job in summarizing the conference.  I will be relying on his posts.  I realize that cannot count for a refutation of the hard cessationist line.  Fair enough).

Macarthur begins by urging his continuationist friends that he is not being unloving.  Okay.  I can buy that.  Since I am actually dealing with specific arguments, I will by-pass much of it.  However, he writes,

There is error in this movement all the way through it. 90% of the movement believe in the prosperity gospel. 24 to 25 million of these people deny the Trinity. 100 million in the movement are Roman Catholic.

Again, against whom are we arguing?  It is manifestly unfair to lump Storms and Grudem into this group simply because they agree on a few points..  Cessationists need to do a better job on this point or many people will simply start ignoring them.   My underlying counter-thesis is this:  Refute Wayne Grudem’s The Gift of Prophecy.   Sub-thesis:  Answer this question, “Would you include your hero, D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones into the above group, since he was a continuationist?  Why or why not?”

MacArthur’s 8 Statements:

1.  When theologically conservative men give credibility to this movement the whole movement gains credibility

Answer:  Papists use the same line against the Reformers.

2.  God gave special revelatory gifts, signs and miracles to validate His revelation. Hebrews 2:3 expounds on this.

Answer:  Hebrews 2:3 says nothing about whether these gifts continue or not.  Grudem and Piper specifically admit that the gifts validated the word.   That says nothing about whether they should be permanent or temporary.

3.  Point (3) is purely anecdotal and borderline bizarre.

4.  Continuationists who insist that God gives special revelation today gives way to people being led by confusion and error.

Answer:  We are using the term “revelation” in different ways. Again, I have Grudem’s thesis in mind, none other.

5.  Continuationists tacitly deny the reformed tenet of Sola Scriptura.

Answer:  Again, see above.   Further, we need to be clear on what we mean by “canon.”  The Canon, as Bruce Metzger, Sproul, and others have pointed out, is a fallible collection of infallible books.  I do not believe the church canon should receive other books, but if we admit to the “fallibilist” definition, as we must, then technically the claim to extra revelation (which is not what Grudem is claiming) doesn’t contradict the canon.   If you don’t hold to the fallibilist definition, then there really isn’t any response you can offer to the Eastern Orthodox.  In fact, they will eat you alive.  

And while we're at it, let's define sola scriptura:  Scripture is the norm that norms our norms.  This is the classical definition.  It acknowledges Scripture as the highest authority but also subordinate authorities.  So how does a "Word of wisdom" contradict this?  We are given no argument.

6.  This point deals specifically with tongue-speaking, which is not my interest. 

7.  Continuationists assert the gift of healing and in turn affirm the fraudulent ministry of healers. 

Answer:  The consequent does not follow the antecedent.   The fraud healers should receive the death penalty in a godly society, but that doesn’t mean the gift of healing expired.  Notice that MacArthur is not using a biblical argument. 

8.  Continuationists distract from the Holy Spirit’s true ministry by enticing people to buy into a false ministry

Answer: Again, it depends on whom he is speaking.

A moderate defense of George Berkeley?

On first glance Berkeley's philosophy seems silly.  An object is not real in the classical sense, but only exists as it is perceived and constituted by the observer's stable recollection of its properties.  I don't hold to British Empiricism, but this raises an interesting point.

Heisenberg and Quantum Mechanics point out that an object (albeit on the sub-atomic level) behaves differently depending on the location of the observer.