Neo-Calvinism: early failures and post-Reflections

This post can be similarly titled, "For and Against Van Til." I've decided not to write this in a strictly logical order. Rather, it will be written in Nietzschean style [bracketed paragraph numbering]. As a side note: I have read William Young's WTJ article on Neo-Calvinism. I have no problem with it. He simply points out that Neo-Calvinism tended to denigrate experiential religion. Perhaps they did. That's an emphasis argument, though, and does not bear on whether other distinctives are true or false. (And almost identically tragic results can be found in the Anglo-Scottish Calvinist tradition).

[1]

What would Neo-Calvinism look like without its emphasis on politics? Yeah, I know sphere sovereignty and all that, but let's be honest: among neo-Calvinists what gets talked about the most, the church or politics?

[2]

One area where Neo-Calvinism [let's just call it Reformational Theology from now on) actually got right and later generations, even the Banner of Truth men, dropped the ball was in theological prolegomena. If you read Kuyper and Bavinck, they are fighting hard for ectypal theology. Can Together4theGospel say the same thing? Can Banner of Truth?

[3]

But theology is more than prolegomena, and the Reformational theology didn't do a great job on anthropology. Wanting a rich creation theology, and fearing gnostic dualisms (both admirable goals), they came very close to rejecting the doctrine of the soul. I've summarized their position here.

[4]

The most important aspect of Reformational Theology is that it was a constructive theology. That's very hard to do. It's easy to build a theology of critique, whether Rome or other deviant systems. And that's important, for the battle must be fought in every generation. But a soul (pun intended) cannot live long on a theology of criticism.

Bavinck constructed an entire theology around "New Creation." Yet he never drifted from Reformed Principial theology. This is nothing short of an ultimate triumph. Dooyeweerd's 14 or 15 modalities might sound odd, and I suspect he overdid it, but he simply wanted to outline man-in-the-world and man-in-relation-to-God.

Now for the Criticism of Reformational Theology

[5]

The emphasis on politics, at least practically speaking, failed miserably. Amsterdam is Sodom. The American front is slightly different. In America Reformational theology went in two directions. One school, the Toronto school (and with is periphery in the CRC and other Dutch American communities), systematically embraced sphere-sovereignty but with a temptation to more left-wing, socialistic politics. The more conservative appropriating of Kuyper is best seen in the Reconstructionist school and the Christian Right, neither of which is a success today. Recons are on the extreme margin of society (and may they stay there) while the Christian Right/Moral Majority has more or less lost the war.

The Way Forward: What Should We keep and where should we go?

[6]

To the degree that the Reformation School sees itself primarily as a Dutch(y) outpost, it is a non-starter. The worst thing that anyone can do is contrast "Amsterdam with x." This prevents Reformational Theology from fully incorporating gains from other traditions.  For example, Nicholas Wolterstorff has suggested commonalities between Bavinck and Reformed Epistemology, which has its roots in the Scottish Common Sense tradition (Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “Herman Bavinck—Proto Reformed Epistemologist.” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 133–46.). This is a major advance in epistemology and only possible because Wolterstorff didn't get blinded by a Dutch ghetto mentality.  

[7]

I admit I don't care too much for the "reclaiming politics for Christ" mindset.  Christ makes claims to the political life, to be sure, but I am also reminded of something Don Carson said, "If Kuyper lived in the killing fields of Cambodia, one suspects he would have framed the relationship between Christ and culture differently" (Christ and Culture Revisited, ix). Of course, that doesn't change whether or not Christ owns politics, but it does highlight the tensions--tensions that are already evident in Scripture (see Romans 13 and Revelation 13).  

[8]

I like the organic motif.  Some have suspected a latent Hegelianism within the organic motif, but I think that criticism falls short for a couple of reasons.  For one, it's never argued that "organicism necessitates Hegelianism." It's just asserted.  Secondly, Christ himself had no fear of using it because of future Hegelian overtones (John 15).  Thirdly, let's assume it's a valid criticism.  Even then, it doesn't prove what people fear most in Hegel: Pantheism.  If it does prove pantheism, then we need to see an argument for that claim, which would include primary sources from both Dutch Reformed theology and German idealism. A tall order.

[8.1]

But what does Bavinck mean by the organic metaphor?  A full discussion will be found in his Dogmatics, but we can offer a brief one here.  The metaphor  traces the idea of revelation in its form and content and how it correlates with the rest of life (Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 18). Revelation doesn't appear in the abstract. It is always context-ed. God's unfolding drama in history is never a bunch of propositions falling from the sky. Not even Plato can be accused of that crude a view (though many Calvinist critics of Reformational Theology tend hold just that view). It meets Israel at Israel's situation--calling, changing, and challenging that situation.

Conclusion

[9]

We can say two things about it:
1) In terms of a Reformed theology for future generations and a Reformed social ethic, Reformational theology failed miserably. 2) In terms of future philosophical reflection, it was a mighty triumph of the highest order. Without neo-Calvinism we would not have Alvin Plantinga. Without Alvin Plantinga, we would not have seen a renaissance in Christian Philosophy.
3) I know a lot of his cultural philosophy borders on the bizarre, but James K. A. Smith is a highly competent philosopher who has done more than anyone today to make Dooyeweerd relevant.

Therefore, we should mine the Reformational theology for insights on the human person and his knowing within his life situation. We should never content ourselves at having arrived--or even worse, having arrived in our ethnic situation. (It's really hard to nail Eastern Orthodoxy's phyletism when we have slogans like "Ain't Dutch, Ain't Much.")

Works Cited

Bavinck, Herman. Philosophy of Revelation.
Carson, D. A. Christ and Culture Revisited.
Wolterstorff,  Nicholas. “Herman Bavinck—Proto Reformed Epistemologist.” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 133–46.
Young, William. "Historic Calvinism And Neo-Calvinism." Westminster Theological Journal 36:1 (Fall 1973) p. 49. 
Recommended Websites
Paideia Press.
All of Life Redeemed (probably the classic site).

Recommended Works
Bavinck, Herman.  Reformed Dogmatics 4 volumes.  Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic. 2008.
Clouser, Roy. The Myth of Religious Neutrality.  Notre Dame Press.
Dooyeweerd, Herman.  New Critique of Theoretical Thought 4 volumes.  Good luck finding it.
Kuyper, Abraham.  Principles of Sacred Theology. Westminster Discount Books.
Spykman, Gordon. Reformational Theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1992.
Plantinga, Alvin. and Wolterstorff, Nicholas. eds. Faith and Rationality. Notre Dame Press, 1983.
Plantinga, Alvin.  God and Other Minds.  Cornell University Press, 1990.
Wolters, Al.  Creation Regained.  Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005. A beautiful manifesto.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Until Justice and Peace Embrace. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983.
--------------. Reason within the Bounds of Religion. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988.

Reformed Epistemology Beyond Plantinga

Owen Anderson has written a small piece aiming to show difficulties in Alvin Plantinga’s conception of warrant.   Anderson asserts that Plantinga’s position leaves the unbeliever with a legitimate excuse for not believing in the Christian God.  Along the way Anderson advances a number of philosophical theses that I maintain are problematic for a Reformed Christian and subsequently limit the agreement one has concerning his critique of Plantinga.

This paper will follow the following structure:

1. Plantinga and Warrant
2. Anderson’s Critique
3. Anderson Critiqued
4. Warrant without Defeaters
5. Anderson’s position incompatible with Reformed Theology
6. Plantinga Reconsidered
7. Conclusion

Plantinga and Warrant

In short, Plantinga’s position maintains that one is warranted in believing in God without having to give justification for foundationalist evidential demands.  Further, one is warranted in knowledge if one’s cognitive faculties are functioning properly in a proper environment.

Anderson’s Critique

Anderson says Plantinga’s position is incompatible with Christian teaching because of the following claims:

1. Guilt presupposes inexcusability
2. Inexcusability presupposes ability
3. Ability presupposes clarity
4. Clarity presupposes rationality

The main criticism is that Plantinga (seems) to allow that other religions can claim warrant for belief and thus evade Romans 1:21.  Another criticism is that Plantinga does not allow that God’s existence is sufficiently clear.

Anderson Critiqued

P1 seems like standard ethical and Christian teaching.   P2 is incompatible with Reformed Theology (see below).  P3 is not necessarily wrong, but it rests upon a major confusion throughout Anderson’s paper.  When he says “ability presupposes clarity,” does he mean moral ability or natural ability?  In fact, I don’t think he can answer the question because of his commitment to P2.  However, I don’t disagree that there is a clear, rational standard to which men are held accountable. P4 is fine; however, I have a problem with the way this clause is phrased:  if the alternatives to knowing God are rational then humans have an excuse to not knowing God.

Further, there is a difference between the clarity of God’s revelation and willing not to worship God.  Indeed, Anderson writes, “Inexcusability requires that if they had wanted to, they could have known God as they should have.”  Besides the confusion of moral and natural ability, this entails Anderson’s rather unique view about Romans 1:21. In another essay Anderson argues that this verse does not teach that the heathen knew God, but that God’s special revelation has undergone decay.   

For the moment I feel justified (warranted?) in standing with the tradition of commentaries on Romans 1:21 and say that the unbeliever knew (in some sense; I wonder if we are all interpreting “know” in a univocal sense) God.  

Excursus:  Commentaries on Romans 1:21

(Instead of quoting publisher, text, and page number, I will simply say Charles Hodge in loc, etc.)

John Murray:  “The knowledge of God must in this context be the knowledge derived from the manifestation given in the visible creation...The inexcusableness resides in the fact that being in posession of this knowledge they did not render to God the glory.”

John Calvin: “He plainly testifies here, that God has presented to the minds of all the means of knowing him, having so manifested himself by his works, that they must necessarily see what of themselves they seek not to know.”

Charles Hodge:  “Thus, in the first instance, in verse 19 and 20, he proved that the heathen had a knowledge of God which rendered them inexcusable, and then the fact that they were without excuse, is proved by showing that they did not act in accordance with the truth.”

Anderson says his paper is about “the clarity of God’s existence, not epistemic rights.”  Well, if that’s true then why is Anderson discussing Plantinga’s earlier works (Warrant and Proper Function and Warrant the Current Debate)?  Those books are defending the claim of warrant against foundationalism; they are not attempting to set forth God’s existence.  

A critique on more factual grounds

This doesn’t really affect the substance of the paper, but it’s worth pointing out.  Anderson says “Plantinga never endeavors to show that it is clear that God exists.”  This is odd, since Plantinga has defended the Ontological Argument (Doubleday 1965) and has offered Two Dozen or So arguments for the existence of God.   If this is indeed what Anderson is saying, then (P)3--4 fall.  

Warrant Without Defeaters

Much of Anderson’s critique seems to operate on only half of the Plantingian position.  Anderson writes, “All the adherents of world religions are rational in this broad sense of the term,” yet Christianity holds them accountable without excuse.  This is similar to the famous “Great Pumpkin” charge thrown at Plantinga:  Why can’t someone say that belief in the Great Pumpkin is perfectly basic and one has rational warrant?

If that is all that warrant said, then that would be a problem.  Yet just because one claims “properly basic belief” and “warrant” does not mean the position is immune to defeaters.  Consider:

1. a more thorough and robust account of a warranted belief is one that is not subject to defeaters.  So, I'd say that and adherent of ____(insert deity)_____ has undefeated defeaters (think Islam, for example).
2. Also, if one includes positive arguments (perhaps revamped natural theology ones), then we actually have reasons *for* our belief as well.  Why should I believe in ____(insert deity)_____?  I can tell others why they should believe in ____Yahweh____, can they do the same?
3. many versions of beliefs in _____(insert deity)____ do not provide a basis for our belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties, hence they'd have a defeater for all their beliefs, including belief in ____(insert deity)____.  So, why should the believer in ___Shivah___ think his/her cognitive faculties are reliably aimed at truth?  Does ___Shivah___ believe in those categories (i.e., true/false)?  If not, would he design his "children" to have cognitive faculties with beliefs aimed at truth?  And, if so, why believe this?  Is it revealed in the Vedas?  Where?

Anderson’s Position incompatible with Reformed Theology

Anderson holds to the principle “ought = ability.”  This follows upon his confusion of natural ability with moral ability.  This is not an extreme position to hold, as most free-will theists hold it today.   The problem is that Reformed theology rejects this position.  If [moral] ought = [physical] ability, then man has free will to believe in God apart from considerations of sin.  This is perfectly consistent with Kantian ethics and Arminianism.  It is not with Reformed theology.

Anderson writes, “If this [sin] is the result of something outside my control, then I cannot be held accountable.”  But the consequent does not follow, at least not universally.  What about original sin?  Why am I held accountable for what Adam did?  

Plantinga Reconsidered

Let’s pretend for a moment that Anderson’s critique holds.  What must we give up of Plantinga’s position and what can we retain.  Anderson says Plantinga’s views are incompatible with Christianity, yet one suspects that Anderson is overreaching on Plantinga.  Plantinga’s initial forays into warrant  merely dealt with belief in general in response to Cliffordian Evidentialism.

Beyond Foundations

The initial attraction to Plantinga’s “warrant” is not its providing an argument for the existence of God.  In fact, I don’t think that is Plantinga’s position at all.  As I’ve read the development of Plantinga’s corpus, Plantinga developed his “warrant” in response to classical foundationalism’s challenge on epistemic justification, not for whether warrant offers a “silver bullet” argument for God’s existence (to borrow an illustration from John Frame).  

The evidentialist challenge: if it is not rational to accept some proposition about God, then one ought not to accept it; b) it is not rational to accept such propositions without adequate evidence and with firmness not exceeding the evidence (Wolterstorff 136).  But as Plantinga pointed out, evidentialism of this sort usually connotes a form of internalism: I must satisfy some epistemic duty in order to have proper belief in God.  However, why should we suppose that it is irrational to accept theistic belief in the absence of evidence?  What exactly is the obligation here?  Which intellectual obligations?  What about Russellian paradoxes, when a self-evidently false follows from a self-evidently true?

If internalism is false, as I maintain the above evidential variety is, does this mean some form of externalism follows?  I think so, though I can’t argue it here.  But more to the point:  are all forms of externalism versions of warrant?  I don’t think so.  Reliabilism and models of perception are externalist, though inadequate by themselves.  

Let’s Assume Plantinga is in Fact False

If Plantinga’s account is incorrect, must I abandon externalism and embrace internalism?  I have seen no convincing arguments that I should (though to be fair that wasn’t Anderson’s point). But are all of Plantinga’s unique points wrong?  Let’s consider “proper function.”  If I am drunk are my reasoning faculties performing correctly?  Obviously not.  But that’s probably not why people object to “Proper Function.”  Does sin make my cognitive faculties malfunction?  Well, maybe.  This brings us in to the psychology of belief, a study I am not prepared to enter.

Conclusion

Anderson’s critique has forced Reformed Epistemology adherents to clarify a number of issues.  Unfortunately, one has to pay a high price to fully accept Anderson’s position.  His equivocation of natural/moral ability and is ought = can positions render many of his conclusions unacceptable to traditional Reformed theology.

Works Cited:

Calvin, John. Romans.

Hodge, Charles. Commentary to the Romans.

Murray, John. Commentary to the Romans.

Plantinga, Alvin.  “Reason and Belief in God.” Faith and Rationality.

-----------------.  The Ontological Argument.  Doubleday, 1965.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas.  “Can Belief in God be Rational if it Has no Foundations?”  Faith and Rationality.  Notre Dame.  

Charles Hodge Systematic Theology (A Review)

Charles Hodge is the highpoint of American theology. While Dabney searched deeper into the issues, Hodge’s position (if only because the North won) allowed him a wider influence. Thornwell was the more brilliant orator and Palmer the greater preacher, but Hodge was the teacher and systematician. Of the Princetonians Hodge is supreme. His writing style is smoother than Warfield’s and he is deeper than his predecessors.



We rejoice that Hendrickson Publishing is issuing these three volumes at $30. Even with the page-length quotations in Latin, Hodge is strong where American Christianity is weak. A renaissance in Hodge would reinvigorate discussions about epistemology, the doctrine of God and God’s knowledge, justification, and God’s law. We will look at Hodge’s discussion of epistemology, doctrine of God, human nature (including both sin and free volition), soteriology, and ethics.

Common Sense Realism

Far from stultifying the gospel, Hodge’s position safeguards the reliability of “truth-speak” and if taken seriously today, adds another angle to the “convert” phenomenon. A properly basic belief is one that doesn’t need another belief for justification. I’m not so sure if Hodge is making that claim. However, he does anticipate some of Plantinga’s positions by saying that God so constituted our nature to believe x, y, and z. My aim is to show from Hodge’s own words that our cognitive faculties are (1) reliable and (2) made so by God. I will advance upon Hodge’s conclusions: a commoner can read the Bible and get the general “gist” of it apart from an infallible interpreting body. Secondly, to deny the above point attacks the image of God. Thirdly, to deny the above point is to reduce all to irrationality. The practical application: Those who deny this position often find themselves looking for “absolute” and infallible arbiters of the faith. Such a position denies a key aspect of our imago dei.

“Any doctrine [and Hodge is using this word in the technical sense of philosophic and/or scientific beliefs], therefore, which contradicts the facts of consciousness, or the laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature, must be false” (I: 215).
“Our knowledge of mind, therefore, as a thinking substance, is the first and most certain, and the most indestructible of all forms of knowledge; because it is involved in self-knowledge…which is the indispensable condition of all knowledge” (I: 277).

It is interesting to note his reference to self-knowledge. One is reminded of Calvin’s duplex cognito dei.

Doctrine of God

…[S]tart with the revelation that God has made of himself in the constitution of our own nature and in his holy word. This method leads to the conclusion that God can think and act, that in him essence and attributes are not identical (I: 564).

It’s also interesting to note Hodge’s comment about God constituting our nature in a certain way. Shades of Thomas Reid.

“To say, as the schoolmen, and so many even of Protestant theologians, ancient and modern, were accustomed to say, that the divine attributes differ only in name, or in our conceptions, or in their effects, is to destroy all true knowledge of God…If in God knowledge is identical with eternity, knowledge with power, power with ubiquity, and ubiquity with holiness, then we are using words without meaning (I: 371-372).
The attributes of God, therefore, are not merely different conceptions in our minds, but different modes in which God reveals himself to his creatures…just as our several faculties are different modes in which the inscrutable substance self reveals itself in our consciousness and acts (I: 374).

So what do we mean by simplicity? Rome has a thorough, if ultimately chaotic, answer to this question. Orthodoxy has an outstanding response to Rome, but nothing in terms of a constructive view of Simplicity. Following Turretin, Hodge writes,

The attributes are to be distinguished not realiter, but;”virtualiter, that is, there is a real foundation in the divine nature for the several attributes attributed to him (I: 370).
What does virtualiter mean?

Richard Muller defines it as “literally, i.e., with virtue or power” (Muller 371).
It’s interesting that Muller mentioned “power.” This corresponds with Radde-Galwitz’s interpretation of Gregory of Nyssa. Alluding to Michel Barnes he notes that divine power is the causal capacity rooted in the divine nature; inseparable from the divine nature and gives rise to the divine energies (Barnes 183). Further, each “Good” (or attribute, in our case) entails another.

Human Nature

Charles Hodge’s key argument regarding the free will controversy is this: does infallible certainty of a future event destroy human liberty? He answers no. Hodge gives a lengthy explanation that the Reformed tradition can maintain free agency, yet God’s foreknowledge of future actions is not threatened (Hodge, II: 296-304). Part of his discussion is labored and a bit confusing, for he realizes that “free will” has as many glosses as it does adherents. He explains what is and is not meant by “free will.”

I do not always agree with his defining of the terms. He lists the three options: necessity (fatalism), contingency (free-willism) and certainty (Reformed and Augustinianism). My problem with Hodge’s list is that traditional Reformed orthodoxy made a distinction between the necessity of the consequent (absolute necessity as pertaining to God ad intra) and necessity of the consequent thing (conditional necessity). My problem with his term “contingency” is that it risks confusion: God is a necessary being; man is a contingent one. It is evident, though, that Hodge makes clear he means the semi-Pelagian options. He does advance the discussion forward, though, with his use of the term “certainty.” Hodge is content to show that opponents of the Reformed system cannot demonstrate a contradiction between the proposition “all events are foreknown by God and will happen with certainty,” and the proposition, “Man can make rational choices apart from absolute necessity.” Hodge lists several metaphysical and biblical examples. God is a most perfect being. This is a certainty (else we are doomed!), yet few will argue that God’s liberty is impinged. Jesus’s crucifixion was foreknown in the mind of God, yet the Roman soldiers sinned most freely.

This raises an interesting issue: many semi-Pelagians try to duck the Reformed charge by saying, “God simply foresees who will believe and elects them based on his foreseeing their believing.” Besides being a crass works-righteousness, does this really solve the problem? Is their belief any less certain? If the semi-Pelagian argues that election is God’s foreseeing their faith, then we must ask if this is a certain action? It’s hard to see how they can say no. If they do affirm that it is certain, then they must at least agree (hypothetically) with the Reformed gloss that certainty does not destroy free agency.

So what does it mean for a man to act “freely.” Few people on either side ever define this satisfactorily. Hodge loosely follows the standard Reformed gloss: the will follows the intellect (which is assumed to be fallen). Man can be said to act freely if he acts naturally: man acts according to the way he was created (II: 304).

Imputation

One of the objections to the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ is that the transfer of guilt (ours/Adam’s) and/or the transfer of righteousness (Christ’s) is morally and legally impossible. Hodge answers:

“The transfer of guilt or righteousness, as states of consciousness or forms of moral character, is indeed impossible. But the real transfer of guilt as”a responsibility to justice, and as righteousness which satisfies that justice,’ is no more impossible than that one man should pay the debt of another. All that the bible teaches on the subject is that Christ paid as a substitute our debt to the justice of God” (II: 540-541).

Justification

Vol. 3: 114ff

Hodge gives a wonderful and penetrating treatment on justification. He notes that The nature of the act of justification Does not produce subjective change. It is an Act of God not in his character of sovereign but in character of judge (speech-act?)

Includes both pardon and declaration that believer is just in the sight of the law. It is not saying that the believer is morally just in terms of character. The believer is just in relation to the law–guilt is expiated (120). It is not mere pardon: sinner’s guilt is expiated (125). Mere Pardon does not produce reconciliation (128).

Scriptural usage:
Dt 25:1. Judge pronounces a judgment. He does not effect a character change. Condemnation is the opposite of justify. A sentence of condemnation does not effect an evil character change. Thus, if sentence of condemnation is judicial act, so is justification (123).

Romanist Views
Infusion of righteousness does nothing for guilt (though possibly they would say the guilt is washed away in baptism). Accordingly, justification does nothing for the satisfaction of justice. Even if the Romanist claim that justification makes me holy were true, I would still be liable to justice (133).

Satisfaction of Justice
An adequate theory of justification must account for satisfying justice (130). Nothing “within” me can do that.

Works of the Law
Scripture never designates specifically “what kind of works” (137). The word “law” is used in a comprehensive sense. Nomos binds the heart–law of nature. Not ceremonial. Paul says “thou shalt not covet” as the law that condemns me (Romans 7). Not ceremonial. Grace and works are antithetical. It doesn’t make sense to subdivide works (138).
Ground
The Ground of justification is always what is done for us, not what is in us

• justified by his blood (Romans 5:19)
• by his righteousness (5:18)
• If just means “morally good,” then it would be absurd to say that one man is just because of another (141).
• We say that the claims against him are satisfied.
• When God justifies the ungodly, he does not declare him morally godly, but that his sins are expiated.

Hypothetical Objections Proves Protestant View
Why object over possible antinomianism if faith alone not true (Romans 6; p. 140)?

The Law of God

Like older Reformed systematics, Hodge has a treatment of the Decalogue. Much of it is common fare. What is interesting is the way he handled it. By reading his arguments we see a commentary on problematic cultural issues. Of particular importance, which I won’t develop here, are his expositions of the 4th and 7th commandment. In the latter he specifically deals with Romanist tyranny in marriage.

Throughout the whole discussion he is combating Jesuitism. We do not see that today. Modern systematics, even conservative ones, are scared of appearing “conspiratorial.” Hodge’s age was a manlier age. They called it for what it was. They knew that Jesuits swear an oath to destroy Protestant nations by any means necessary. And they knew that only the Law of God provides spiritual and political liberty.  This is why God doesn’t take conservative, political evangelicalism seriously today.
Hodge is not entirely clear, though. When he wants to prove the Levitical prohibitions as binding today on sanguinuity and close-kin marriage, he argues like Greg Bahnsen. Almost word for word. If he did that today he would be fired. But when he wants to argue against more theocratic penalties, he sounds like a dispensationalist.

Sacraments

Keith Mathison’s book on Calvin’s view of the Supper is now something of a classic, and deservedly so. I am in large agreement with most of the book. I certainly lean towards Calvin. That said, I think one of the unintended consequences of the book is a slighting of Charles Hodge among the “Young Turk Calvinists.” It’s not that I disagree with Mathison or Calvin, but I am concerned about the new interest in Nevin. I used to be a hard-core Hegelian for 3 years. Nevin was also an Hegelian. Granted, Nevin pulled back from the worst of Hegel. I am not so sure Nevin’s modern interpreters fully understand that. I hope to give something of a modified defense of Hodge on the Supper:

“really conveying to the believing recipient, Christ, and all the benefits of his redemption…There must be a sense, therefore, in which believers receive the body and blood of Christ” (III: 622).

However,

Anything is said to be present when it operates duly on our perceiving senses” (637). I am not so sure Hodge is able to dodge Mathison’s charge. I agree with Hodge’s common sense realism, but I don’t think Hodge’s next point follows: “In like manner Christ is present when he thus fills the mind, sheds abroad his love into our hearts…” (638). I suppose the question at issue is this: we grant that Christ fills the mind. We grant that sensory operations also fill the mind, but it does not necessarily follow that Christ is present in the Supper in a sensory manner. In some sense I think all Reformed would agree with that.

Hodge makes the common Reformed point that “what is affirmed to be present is not the body and blood of Christ absolutely, but his body as broken and his blood as shed” (641). This is a decisive point against High Church traditions: when they insist upon a literal reading, “This is my body,” the Reformed can point that Christ’s wasn’t sacrificed yet, so the “body” at issue can’t be the sacrificial body.

Hodge concludes his exposition of the Reformed teaching with “There is therefore a presence of Christ’s body in the Lord’s Supper; not local but spiritual; not to the senses, but to the mind and to faith; and not of nearness, but of efficacy” (643).

The Problem with Nevin

Throughout the work is a running attack on Nevin’s theology. Hodge makes a point that isn’t always grasped by Nevin’s defenders today: if we accept Nevin’s platonic essentialism, especially with regard to the Eucharist and Christology, then we run into huge problems. If Christ assumed the universal humanity, then he also assumed the rules of predicating of genus: the more universal a genus, the less specific it is. If Christ is the universal humanity, then there is nothing specifically human about him!

Evaluation

It is superfluous to sing of Hodge’s greatness. That is a given. I do have some issues with his treatment. Hodge routinely appeals to the “received consensus of the church” for many of his doctrines. There are several problems with this. Aside from the most general teachings from the Creeds, appeals to the Patrum Consensus are problematic and question-begging. Further, the Eastern Orthodox Church, to which Hodge sometimes appeals, would not share his assumptions about Adam’s imputed guilt, for example.