Notes on the Faerie Queene, Book 2

Here is the allegory of Temperance. It follows the standard medieval warrior pilgrimage. Sumpter has done a fine job of modernizing the spelling while retaining the exalted style. However, there are a few flaws with Sumpter's approach (I am not criticizing his work. It is literally one of a kind and preciously needed). Sumpter ignores (or doesn't notice) Spenser's Neo-Platonism. Without understanding Spenser's commitment to Neo-Platonism, parts of the story are incoherent. Here are some themes that will guide the reader.



Neo-Platonic Themes

Reason masters passions: “Yet with strong reason mastered passions frail” (VI.40). But this isn’t standard Neo-Platonism of the monkish sort. Passions aren’t bad. They just need to be guided by reason.

*Mediating Spirits. Neo-Platonism of its various forms sees a chain of being connecting all of reality. The material is suspended by the spiritual. Transcendence, therefore, can be found in the lowest link of the chain. Along this chain are mediating spirits (powers, angels, fairies).

*Because of his Neo-Platonism, Spenser sees a greater role for angels than we do today (VIII:1-2). Angels actively engage and empower man and thwart the enemy.

*It seems that Spenser identifies “Temperance” as a “god” (IX.1). Granted, he isn’t using god in the crude polytheistic sense. Rather, temperance seems to be a “power” or even “Archetype.” True, this could be merely poetic license, but given Spenser’s Neo-Platonism, it fits neatly.

*In the Bower of Bliss the heroes (Guyon and Palmer) come across a “false Genius.” If we accept that these characters (Genius et al) are Archetypes, we can then add the standard (neo)Platonic insight that the Archetypes and Forms have causal power. But we have a problem. The “Genius” here is a false Genius, as Spenser clearly argues (XII.47). So clearly this Genius isn’t the real genius, but a shadow one.

EXCURSUS: ALMA'S CASTLE

Alma's Castle in Book X illustrates how thoroughly committed to Neo-Platonism (and how familiar with the occult) Spenser was.  Sumpter isn't aware of these connections.

Sumpter misses the implication that Memory has hermetic overtones (Yates 2014).  Memory mediates a society’s passing down of Absolute Spirit (Magee 87).
Speculative Philosophy holds up a mirror (speculum) to the Idea itself: it allows the Idea to comprehend itself (88).  In fact, following the Kabbalist tradition, the “mirror” allows one to behold the deeper essence of Spirit (120).

This brings us back to the Hermetic Art of Memory.  “Imagination” is to evoke from memory the Perennial Philosophy.  In other words, to echo Jung, it draws out from within the unconscious.

This is rather speculative.  Is this what Spenser really had in mind? I think so.  Dame Frances Yates argues that Spenser “inherited much more than Neo-Platonism” (Yates 2001, 112). Spenser describes the man (representing memory) as “of infinite remembrance” (IX.52). Man is finite, not infinite--unless man himself was drawing upon a universal subsconcious.  I suggest this is what Spenser had in mind.  (Interestingly, Yates comments specifically on this very Canto; 114).

Yates further argues that the structure Spenser gives suggests that Man is a Microcosm of the universe.   In Canto 22 we read of a “circle” and a “triangle” with a “quadrate” (cube) in between.  The four-sided cube represents the four elements of the world, which is proportioned equally by “seven and nine.”  Seven is the number of the planets and nine is the angelic hierarchy.  If the cube is between seven and nine, then it is an eight, or an octave.  This could also represent the Temple of Solomon.


Conclusion:

Spenser’s work is literally the standard by which all other poetry is compared. Even though (or perhaps because of!) he is a Neo-Platonist, Spenser floods the senses (and the soul) with beauty and creates in the reader a desire not only for the good, but for the Beautiful, for the Heroic--indeed, for the Temperate.

This isn’t accidental. If what we have said about Forms/Archetypes’ having causal power, then then we can expect “pullings” upon our soul when reading Spenser.


Spenser’s most memorable creation is the Bower of Bliss (as Lewis said, no prude can read Spenser). Guyon’s actions represent a neat twist in Neo-Platonism. The most temperate action is to go into a frenzy and destroy the Bower. This isn’t what we expect from a Neo-Platonist. Spenser doesn’t negate the passions--he calls them into Reasons’s service, but all the while they remain very, very passional. Spenser may have just squared the circle: he may have just redeemed Neo-Platonism.  Guyon isn't an Anchorite who tries to transcend the realm of passions.

What about Sumpter’s annotations? They are a mixed bag. When Sumpter is explaining ethics, theology, or literary symbolism, his annotations are amazing. When he tries to be funny they are worse than awful. Remember the Ron Swanson style of humor? If you have to try hard to be funny, you aren’t. Hilarity should flow from your very being. You shouldn’t have to strain to be funny. I say that because some of the wannabe funny footnotes seriously distract from the story.

Jesus and Nonviolence

It struck me while reading this that "nonviolence" is not the same thing as Pacifism.  The latter includes the former, certainly, but the latter has political connotations that the former does not.

Wink suggests that "nonviolence" is a third way beyond Institutional Violence and Pacifism.  The former, argues Wink, represents the "principalities and powers" while Pacifism simply accepts the status quo, thus further strengthening the powers.   I think Wink's analysis of the situation is a bit simplistic, but he offers some unique insights on application.



Wink rebuts crass readings of Jesus and Romans 13 that urge passivity.  In its context, true nonviolence "provides a way to take on the system in a way that unmasks its essential cruelty and burlesque its pretensions to justice, law, and order" (Wink 21).  In other words, we are to deprive the oppressor of a situation where force is effective.

In short, Wink argues, quoting Ghandi, nonviolent revolution is a "program transforming relationships, ending in a peaceful transfer of power" (71).

So what do we make of it?  In today's Big Brother state whose methods of warfare are simply beyond what we can fathom, any attempt at "armed rebellion" is essentially suicide.  Jesus knew that.  The apostles knew that.  Practically speaking, it is.  These principles of nonviolence allow for a way to deconstruct social situations that affirm the humanity of the Other, thus ending at and aiming for an ontology of peace.

This sounds good on paper, as Wink is well aware of.  Most of the examples of nonviolence, while successful, were quite nervy.  Most people probably aren't up for that.

This book is a marked improvement on Wink's earlier treatments, though with some shortcomings. To be sure, Wink acknowledges that Communists and Marxists have done terrible evils (he was noticeably silent in Unmasking the Powers on this point).  On the other hand, Wink continually rails against "The Powers and Principalities," but we are never quite sure "who" these entities are.   I realize he covered that in his earlier volume, but he could have spent two more pages explaining it here.

All in all, an enjoyable read.

Thornwell and the proverbial Nazis at the door

Taken from Whatsoever Things are True (yes, I realize he wrote before the Nazis)

What is truth in terms of practice--in terms of telling the truth?  Is it a sin to not tell the whole truth, say, to the proverbial Nazis at the door?  Thornwell (and Hodge) would say, “No.”  Thornwell makes the astute point that there is a difference between “deception” and “concealment.”  He writes, “There are things which men have a right to keep secret, and if a prurient curiosity prompts other officiously to pry into them, there is nothing criminal or dishonest in refusing to minister to such a spirit” (80).

But the moralist will respond, “You still have to tell the truth to the Nazis at the door.”  Perhaps, let’s flesh this out.  Let’s say the Nazis ask if there are Jews upstairs (which there are for this scenario)

(1) Is it a “good” to tell the truth and surrender the Jews?

Only the most officious moralist will say yes.  They will define the ethically right thing as “satisfying” one’s duty to truth. (How many are closet Kantians without realizing it?)

(1*) Is it a good to mislead the Nazis and save the Jews?

(1’) Is it a good to save the Jews?

Unless you think a young girl getting tortured by Eichmann is a result of doing “good,” you have to answer “yes” to (1’).

With knowledge of (1’) as affirmative, can we then affirm the entirety of (1*)?  I think we can but the officious moralist still has doubts.  Therefore, we take Thornwell’s statement:

(2) There are things which men have a right to keep secret...spirit.

(2) satisfies the conditions in (1*a), but will it satisfy the moralist?  Maybe not, but at this point the moralist must justify a new proposition:

(~2):  All men are obligated to exhaustive truth statements.

This is absurd and impossible to justify.  Therefore, (2) is warranted.  

Outline of Moreland's Kingdom Triangle

1. Recover the Christian Mind
1. Naturalism as intellectual stronghold
2. Thick and thin worlds
1. “possible world”  : philosophical jargon for the way things could have been.
2. Thin and thick possible worlds
1. Thin world:  world with no objective value.
1. Nothing is as important enough to rise above custom.
2. If there is no objective meaning and value, then there is no drama.
2. Thick worlds
3. Tearing down intellectual strongholds (2 Cor. 10:3-5).
4. Naturalism defined
1. view of knowledge:  whatever exists should be knowable by third-person scientific means.  Only scientific related knowledge counts
2. In the beginning was the particles
5. Problems for naturalism
1. Consciousness: if you start with matter and simply rearrange it, you will only come up with more complex arrangements of brute matter.
2. Secondary qualities” naturalism can account for primary qualities, but not secondary ones like color, taste, texture.
3. Normative properties: naturalism can only tell us what, not should or ought.
4. The human will:  the will is immaterial and responsible for actions.  Why are alcoholics not responsible for their actions but pedophiles are?  A naturalist cannot answer that.
5. Intrinsic value:  
3. Postmodernism:
1. Scientism has eroded the ability to make transcendent judgments.
2. Identifies pomo as a form of cultural relativism about reality, truth, reason (77; possibility problematic).
1. Knowledge is a social construction.
3. Postmodern tenets
1. denial of objective knowledge and reason.
1. psychological objectivity not the same as rational objectivity.
2. Denial of correspondence theory of truth
1. CTT holds to a correspondence relation between truth-bearer (propositions) and truth maker (facts).
2. Those who reject CTT hold to it in order to reject it.
3. Confusion between metaphysical and epistemic notions of truth.
1. metaphysical (correct): absolute truth is same as objective. People discover truth, not create it.  Conforms to laws of logic
2. Postmodernists think absolute truth grounded in Cartesian anxiety.   However, a claim to truth says nothing about my inner, psychological state.
4. Problems for postmodernism
4. From Drama to Deadness
1. Shift from Knowledge to Fideism
2. From human flourishing to satisfaction and desire
1. The ancient “good” life was constituted by intellectual and moral virtue.
2. presupposes the availability of real, nonempircal knowledge.
3. From Duty and Virtue to Minimalist ethics (m.e.)
1. m.e. = do whatever you want as long as you don’t harm others
2. severs the connection between rationality and moral truth.
4. From Classic Freedom to Contemporary Freedom
1. Classical freedom meant the power to do what one ought to do. Presupposes availability of relevant knowledge.
2. Contemporary freedom
5. Classic Tolerance to Contemporary Tolerance
2. Recovery of Knowledge
1. Overview of knowledge: ability to represent things as they are.
1. Knowledge by acquaintance (direct intuition)
2. propositional knowledge (Moreland calls this justified true belief)
3. Know-how (wisdom, skill)
2. Certainty, Confidence, and Simple Knowing
1. Knowledge does not require certainty (and this moves the discussion closer to Plantinga)
1. One’s degree of knowledge can grow over time
2. You can know something without knowing how you know it.
1. problem of the criterion: if we don’t know how we know things, how can we know anything at all?
1. skepticism: bites the bullet.  No knowledge
2. Methodism: starts with a criterion that does not itself count as knowledge.  But this leads to an infinite regress.
3. Particularism: we just know many things without knowing how we know them.  It can respond to skepticism by asking the skeptic for a reasonfor his skepticism.
3. Three Kinds of Knowledge
1. knowledge by acquaintance.  rational awareness.  Humans have the ability to be aware of stuff that aren’t empirically verifiable.
2. Propositional knowledge: I must believe something is true and have adequate grounds for it.
3. Know How
3. Renovation of the Soul (virtue ethics)
1. False self: the self we present to others in order to make the world safe for us (141).
1. Individualistic
2. Infantile
3. Narcissistic
4. The empty self is passive
2. Growing in Christian art of self-denial
1. Classical happiness as virtue-life “Christianized” as eternal life.
1. Less dependent on external circumstances like “pleasure-seeking.”
2. Allows one to become an increasingly unified person.
3. Fostering Spiritual Disciplines
1. Habit, Character, Body, Flesh (Romans 12:1-3)
2. Warning and Dangers.  Moreland recommends some good writers (Dallas Willard) and some dangerous ones (Richard Foster), though to be fair he does offer his own warning (157).
4. Restore the Kingdom’s Power
1. Chapter is mainly anecdotal.  
2. The gospel of the kingdom: the reign and rule of God available in Jesus Christ
1. God has power over demons, darkness, and disease.
3. Jesus’s ministry of the Holy Spirit
1. Dependant on the Spirit’s Power (Luke 4:14)
2. Moreland doesn’t mention it, but this is the Reformed doctrine of the unionis theologia.
4. Abandonment of Cessationism

Theonomy Demands Natural Law

Jus Divinum on the Mosaic Judicials .

We answer, the Laws of the Jewish Church, whether Ceremonial or Judicial, so far forth are in force, even at this day, as they were grounded upon common equity, the principles of reason and nature, and were serving to the maintenance of the Moral Law. … The Jewish Politie is only abrogated in regard of what was in it of particular right, not of common right, so far forth as there was in their Laws either a typicalness proper to their Church, or a peculiarness of respect to their state in that Land of Promise given unto them.  Whatsoever was in their Laws of Moral concernment, or general equity is still obliging …[2]

Conclusion:  Whatever else 19.4 might mean, it clearly states that the use of the judicials in today’s society presupposes some understanding and application of natural law and common sense equity.  This doesn’t mean theonomy is necessarily right or wrong.  However, it does shed some light on how American theonomists tell the narrative.   If one adds to the mix a hyper-presuppositionalism and a fear of all things Thomistic, then there is no way he or she can read the judicials in the way that the writers of the Confession intended.

Equity is a natural law concept, full stop.  The anti-scholastic theonomist of today is borrowing from Thomistic categories in order to reject Thomistic categories (the irony of this somewhat Van Tillian sentence is thick).

I will say the problem another way.  There are two hermeneutical worlds (courtesy of John Stott).

Mosaic World                                                                                               Today's Application

(How do you apply the two on issues where there isn't a clear connection between the two?)

Mosaic World ---------------------------Equity--------------------Today's Application

Here is the problem:  even if theonomy is correct on this point, equity is a generic category that doesn't necessarily include Mosaic specifics.  Equity presupposes (!) that one use analogy and accepted ideas of fairness, and it doesn't always tell you what that is.  But the Bible doesn't really give a complete list of generalities on fairness.

This is why something like Reid's Common Sense Realism is inevitable.